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ABSTRACT 
Human errors occurring during railway maintenance 
activities can significantly reduce the availability of 
equipment. Identification of potential human errors, their 
causes and prediction of the associated probabilities are 
important stages in order to manage such errors. This paper 
investigates the probability of human error during the 
maintenance of railway bogies. A case study examines 
technicians performing maintenance on the disc brake 
assembly unit, wheel set, and bogie frame under various 
error producing conditions in a railway maintenance 
workshop in Luleå, Sweden. The Human Error Assessment 
and Reduction Technique (HEART) is employed to 
determine the probability of human error occurring during 
each of the maintenance tasks, while fault tree analysis is 
used to define the potential errors throughout the 
maintenance process. The probability of a technician 
committing an error during the maintenance of the disc 
brake assembly, wheel set, and bogie frame is found to be 
0.20, 0.039 and 0.021 respectively, with the human error 
probability (HEP) for the entire bogie 0.24. Time pressure, 
ability to detect and perceive problems, over-riding 
information, the need to make decisions and mismatches 
between the operator and designer’s model turn out to be 
major contributors to human error. These findings can help 
maintenance management personnel to better understand the 
error producing conditions that may lead to errors and in turn 
serve as an input to modify policies and guidelines for 
railway maintenance tasks. 
 
Keywords: Human error, maintenance error probability, 
HEART’ 
 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
  
Dhillon (2007) highlights the key role of the railway system 
in a nation’s economy. It is therefore an imperative for all 
stakeholders with a railway network worldwide to aim for a 
safe, highly reliable, and excellent quality railway system 
(Wilson et al., 2007). While the safety of railway operations 
within this system depends on several factors, the role of the 
human is crucial and increasingly recognized as such 
(Hollnagel, 1998; Priestley and Lee, 2008). A large number 
of railway accidents, both in operational as well as 
maintenance procedures, occur due to degraded human 
performance (Dhillon, 2007), which is described as the 
human capabilities and limitations that have an impact on the 
safety and efficiency of operations (Maurino, 1998). Indeed, 
the personnel performing maintenance tasks are confronted 
with a set of error producing conditions (EPCs) within 
rigorous railway maintenance systems, which can degrade 
their performance. Such EPCs include: time pressure, 
negligible feedback, confined work spaces, awkward body 
positions (e.g. bent and/or twisted backs, both arms above the 
shoulder), poorly written procedures and the lack of access to 
the required equipment. These conditions, typically in 
combination, result in various forms of errors and 
consequently failure and accidents.  
 
Surprisingly, human error in railway maintenance has not 
been given the sufficient attention it deserves in the research, 
even though Shapero and his colleagues as far back as 1960 
(Shapero et al., 1960) highlighted that human error is 
responsible for 20–50% of equipment failures. One 
consequence has been a number of high-profile railway 
accidents due to human factors-related maintenance 
problems, e.g. Sarbjeet singh et al. This is an open-access article distributed under the 
terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 United States License, 
which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any 
medium, provided the original author and source are credited. 
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The Grayrigg train accident in the UK in 2007 when a 
train travelling from London to Glasgow derailed, 
resulting in one fatality. This happened when a fault in the 
stretcher bar of the points caused the left and right switch 
rails to become disconnected (RAIB, 2007); 
 
• The 1998 accident on the German Inter City Express 
(ICE) at Eschede, where an eccentric wheel led to wheel 
tyre failure, causing several deaths. 
 
Whilst it’s nearly impossible to eradicate human error, it can 
be minimised through a good maintenance management plan 
and an understanding of the issues that affect errors (HSE, 
2000). To have such an effective planit is a prerequisite to 
identify all the potential human errors, and then quantify their 
probability of occurrence by the appropriate statistical 
approach. Human reliability analysis (HRA) techniques offer 
an opportunity to do this as they aim to identify, quantify and 
reduce the likelihood of errors occurring within a system and 
thereby improve the overall levels of safety in this system 
(Kim et al., 2003). Such techniques have been used in a wide 
range of industries including the healthcare, engineering, 
nuclear, transportation and business sectors. Different HRA 
approaches such as THERP (Technique for human error rate 
prediction), ASEP (Accident sequence evaluation 
Programme) and HEART (Human Error Assessment and 
Reduction Technique) have been developed to predict the 
probability of human error. Originating in the nuclear safety 
industry, HEART is highly flexible and (Humphreys, 1995) 
notes its applicability over a wide range of areas. In 
particular, it is a task-based analysis (Kirwan, 1994) rather 
than a decompositional approach focusing on types of error. 
In the UK, Rail Safety and Standards Board (RSSB, 2012) 
has introduced the Railway Action Reliability Assessment, to 
estimate Human Error Probabilities for railway operations, 
based upon HEART. However, this technique has not been 
applied to railway maintenance it is beyond the scope of this 
technique to provide a detailed list of factors that affect the 
performance of operators, e.g. it ignores the safety culture or 
the safety management of an organisation (RSSB, 2012, p. 
15). 
 
Amongst the most safety critical components of rolling stock 
is the railway bogie, comprising of the brake disc, wheel and 
frame. These important components must meet strict safety 
rules, in terms of the stopping distance associated with a 
maximum average deceleration, in all environmental 
conditions. Regular maintenance audits of  such components 
are conducted, but these typically ignore the human error 
aspects of the maintenance tasks. Singh et al. (2014) and 
Singh and Kumar (2015) have previously analysed the 
potential maintenance human error of the disc brake unit and 
the wheel of the railway bogie, using HEART, based upon a 
case study in the railway maintenance workshop in Lulea, 
Sweden. This paper presents the integrated results of the 
follow up to these two previous studies by analysing the 
HEPs in the performance of maintenance tasks for the 
combined disc brake unit, wheel set and bogie frame in 
various error producing conditions in the same maintenance 
workshop. The HEART technique is again employed to 
determine the probability of human error occurring during 
each maintenance task and discuss implications relating to its 
use. The following sections provide a relevant summary of 
the two previous studies for the purposes of this paper. 
 
1.1 Maintenance and Human Factors: Railway Bogie 
 
Railway sector operate on gigantic dimensions covering over 
miles of distance, loading of million tons of freight, carrying 
million passengers. This sector played a vital role in the 
socio-economic development around the globe. As economy 
marches ahead the railway sector have also taken several 
technological and policy related initiates to meet the 
emerging challenges. While technological initiatives are 
directed towards improved utilization of assets and reduce 
human dependence but this has in turn transformed into a 
newer dimension of human interface. The human factor in 
railway safety has now become function of several additional 
factors making it more critical and complex than in the past. 
Maintenance can be defined as a set of activities required to 
keep a system in “as-built” condition with its original 
productive capacity (Reason, 2000). Maintenance activities 
for rolling stock have a number of tasks that are prone to 
serious human errors, and any negligence in maintenance can 
result in accidents and a subsequent loss of lives. Human 
error, in general, can be defined as the failure to perform a 
specific task that could lead to disruption of scheduled 
operation or result in damage to property and equipment 
(Dhillon et al., 2006). Dhillon (2002) has claimed that 
maintenance error is linked to incorrect repair; further, the 
occurrence of maintenance errors rises with increased 
maintenance frequency. Hence understanding the root causes 
of errors is the first stage in managing the maintenance human 
error. The objective is to identify potential factors causing the 
overall effect in order to reveal key relationships among 
various factors, and the possible causes offer an additional 
insight into process behaviour (Singh and Kumar, 2015). In 
the case study analysed in this paper, the causes of 
maintenance error have been derived from group discussions 
among technicians, supervisors and academic experts. Ten 
group brainstorming sessions were eventually performed, 
with each of them to last approximately two hours. Nine 
experts, i.e., five technicians, two supervisors and two 
academics, participated in the sessions. Among them, the 
maintenance technicians were between 42-45 years old, their 
height and weight ranged between 178-190 cm and 75-85 kg 
respectively, while their working experience between 20-25 
years. The supervisors’ working experience was 11 to 12 
years, while the two academic experts each held a PhD in 
railways maintenance. None of the experts participating in 
this study had a history of chronic or acute illness, 
hypertension or any other major health issues, and no one was 
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taking any prescribed medication prior to or during the period 
of our study. 
 
Based on the findings from the brainstorming sessions, the 
authors constructed the most relevant cause categories. These 
sessions involved a set of questionaries’ followed by 
technical discussions. In general human errors in railway 
maintenance include: disassembly errors, inspection errors, 
maintenance errors, assembly errors and installation errors. 
The causes for human errors in railway maintenance can be 
categorized in four main groups: 
i) work place design and environmental factors,  
ii) maintenance tasks factors  
iii) subject factors  
iv) organization factors.  
 
The consequence of human errors in maintenance results in 
making incorrect decisions, incorrect actions, incorrect 
checks, or, conversely, correct checks on the wrong object. 
The railway maintenance workshop of our case study in 
Luleå, Sweden, uses two types of maintenance audit 
programs for a railway bogie: R1 and the more detailed R4. 
The former is an audit conducted after a maximum of  
1,200,000 km, whereas the latter is a more detailed audit 
conducted after 3,600,000 km. The R1 maintenance audits for 
railway bogies correspond to the detection, monitoring and 
repair of disc brake unit assembly, wheel set and bogie 
frames.  The potential human errors associated with such 
maintenance activities are discussed briefly in the next 
sections. In the present study, the human error probability of 
the railway bogie consisting of disc brake assembly unit, 
wheel set assembly and bogie frame has been evaluated.  The 
disc brake assembly unit on the bogie has four brake packages 
with braking motion and a brake unit The latter consists of a 
brake actuator integrated with a brake controller. The wheel 
set has two brake discs; each is associated with a specific 
lever in the brake unit. Careful and regular maintenance is 
required to ensure even distribution of forces to all wheels. 
Badly set up rigging will cause wheel flats or lead to 
inadequate brake force Brain-storming sessions in railway 
maintenance workshops revealed that poorly executed 
maintenance tasks on the disc brake assembly unit, such as 
improper lubrication of the brake disc, undersize fitting of the 
brake block, tapping screws and cylindrical bolts can cause 
serious errors. Moreover, incorrect measurement of brake 
movement results in a delay in brake lever movement, 
thereby reducing brake performance. This affects the 
distribution of braking forces from a brake cylinder to the 
wheels on the vehicle. In the railway bogie, wheel-set is the 
wheel-axle assembly of a railroad car.  During maintenance, 
the maintenance technicians perform visual inspections 
(maintenance type R1) of the wheel set, axle mounted brake 
disc and bearing box. Visual inspection of an axle mounted 
brake disc and wheels can identify cracks and surface 
imperfections, but these manual tasks may increase the 
probability of human error. Moreover, wheel profile 
measurement, such as fin height, flange thickness, diameter 
of running circle, limit to turning, and Qr (flange slope), is 
also done manually, escalating the probability of human error 
and possibly resulting in wheel-set misalignment and 
increased fuel consumption. The bogie frame is spring-
loaded and guided in the wheel set by rubber elements (Figure 
2) placed between the horn blocks and axle box. The stiffness 
of the rubber material is selected so that the wheel pair has 
the desired mobility in all directions relative to the bogie 
frame. The two spring groups are placed on each side of the 
bogie. Each spring group consists of two spring assemblies 
with inner and outer coil springs in which a yoke is mounted. 
The yokes are connected via tie rods which transmit tensile 
and compressive forces from the basket to the bogie via 
primary suspension and a spindle. The yokes are bolted to the 
basket. In R1 maintenance, the bogie frame, bolster and yoke 
are inspected for possible cracks, deformation and scuff 
marks. There is visual inspection of cracks with a focus on 
welds in the cross member to brake packages and welds in 
the brackets for tie rods. Manual cleaning of the pandel lanks 
and inspection of the dampers (vertical, horizontal and gear) 
is included in R1 maintenance of the bogie frame. All 
dampers (vertical, horizontal and gear) are replaced. Care is 
taken to prevent the leakage of oil from the damper as this 
reduces its performance.  The pandel lank which helps in 
adjusting the height of the bogie is thoroughly cleaned to 
remove any foreign matter. 
  
 
                                              (a) 
 
                         (b) 
Figure 1.  (a, b) Bogie Frame and Dampers 
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2. HUMAN RELIABILITY ANALYSIS OF RAILWAY 
BOGIE 
 
Nine participants were monitored while executing their 
maintenance tasks and questioned during the execution and 
completion of tasks related to maintenance of a bogie (Figure 
1a). The maintenance tasks were initially defined followed by 
a detailed analysis of the bogie components in order to 
identify potential human errors that could cause system 
failures, leading to the development of a relevant risk model, 
Fugure 2. In this study we used the Human Error Assessment 
and Reduction Technique (HEART) (Williams, 1988) to 
evaluate the probability of a human error occurring 
throughout the completion of a specific maintenance task.  
 
HEART suggests that every time a task is performed, there is 
a likelihood of failure and the associated probability of this 
failure is affected by one or more error producing conditions 
(EPCs), for instance the shortage of time or inexperience. 
This technique incorporates the most widely used estimates 
of error rates of generic tasks. There are 9 Generic Task 
Types (GTTs) described in HEART and each is associated 
with a nominal human error probability (HEP). In addition, 
there are 38 Error Producing Conditions (EPCs) that may 
affect reliability, each with a maximum amount by which the 
nominal HEP can be multiplied. In this study we selected the 
GTT F, which refers to the “restore or shift a system to 
original or new state following procedures, with some 
checking”.  
 
 
Figure 2.  Human Reliability Assessment Process (Adapted 
from Kirwan, 1994) 
The proposed nominal human unreliability for this GTT 
equals 0.003 based upon Williams’ (1988) analysis. The 
brainstorming sessions helped to identify the human 
activities that may lead to a potential system failure. These 
sessions  also helped to build a fault tree in order to determine 
the undesired events that could lead to the  failure. The tasks 
related to the maintenance of the wheel, disc brake unit and 
frame were identified and examined in detail and the 
information reviewed from the perspective of risk analysis of 
the system. These tasks were then grouped into disassembly 
tasks, inspection tasks, maintenance tasks, assembly, 
installation and testing tasks.  Each was further divided into 
potential errors in subtasks, such as D1, D2, D3, D4 (for 
disassembly), M1, M2, M3, M4, M5 (for inspection and so 
on; see Table 1), and the HEART nominal human reliability 
values, as given by Williams (1988) were assigned to each 
task. The HEART HEPs were evaluated by applying error 
producing conditions and the engineer’s proportion of affect 
(EPOA) (Williams, 1988). EPOA ranging from 0-1 was 
assigned to each task by two maintenance supervisors. It has 
been observed that in many maintenance tasks of railway 
bogie there were more than one error producing conditions. 
These EPCs are then selected and applied to calculate the 
HEP using Eq. (1) 
 
The error producing conditions (EPC) were considered and 
applied to each task by an expert panel.  
 AiGTTHEP n
i
∑
=
×=
1
       (1)            
Where, GTT is human error associated with each generic task  
 1 + EPOA) x 1)-effectHeart  ((Total =effect  Assessed =A1  
 
Table 1 shows the HEPs of each sub-task associated with the 
maintenance of whole railway bogie (disc brake unit, wheel 
set assembly and bogie frame). The complete table including 
all the relevant tasks is provided in the Appendix 1. In this 
study it was assumed that every time a task is performed 
during maintenance, there is a likelihood of failure (Kirwan, 
1994), this facilitated our evaluation of the probability of 
human error associated with each task and allowed deeper 
understanding of the impact of each individual task. 
Appendix 2 illustrates the fault tree developed to facilitate the 
analysis (Singh et al. (2014) & Singh and Kumar, (2015). The 
events that result in the occurrence of the top event are 
connected and generated by logic gates AND and OR. The 
OR gate provides a true output (i.e., fault) when one or more 
of its inputs are True (fault). After analyzing maintenance 
tasks, the top fault event “M” (here in this case study, 
technician making an error while doing maintenance on the 
bogie) and possible causes or basic fault events (brake 
disassembly error, brake inspection error, brake maintenance 
error, brake installation and testing error, wheel inspection 
error, frame inspection and maintenance error) that cause the 
top event to occur were identified using the OR gate. A fault 
tree was then developed down to the lowest level (Appendix 
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2). The occurrence probability of the technician making an 
error (top event) was calculated using the probabilities of 
occurrence of basic fault evens (disassembly error, brake 
inspection error, brake maintenance error, etc  (Appendix 2). 
In this study we assume that the input events occur 
independently, and the probability of occurrence of the OR 
gate output fault event is given by Eq. (2) (Dhillon, 1999): 
 where P(y0) is the probability of occurrence of the OR gate 
output fault event, y0, k is the number of OR gate input fault 
event, and P(yi) is the occurrence probability of OR gate input 
fault event yi; for i = 1, 2, 3, …, k. While our approach 
provides individual estimates, it must be mentioned that there 
can also be dependencies between the different task steps. 
Such dependencies could exist, for instance, because two task 
steps are being carried out by the same individual or one task 
is being checked by a second person who may not be totally 
independent. Furthermore, one error may make a subsequent 
error more likely; or an error could be repeatedly made in a 
recurring process (RSSB, 2012). However, the need to 
consider dependency in this study is reduced since the GTTs 
are at a rather high level of task detail, and thus dependency 
for sub-tasks is considered in the HEP associated with the 
GTT (RSSB, 2012).  The issue of dependency could also be 
addressed by ensuring that combined human actions in the 
fault or tree do not exceed established limits of human 
reliability, as described by Kirwan (1994).  
 
The maintenance of the disc brake unit includes disassembly, 
measurement, and inspection, corrective maintenance, 
assembly, installation, and testing.  To calculate the 
probability of the top event the probabilities of occurrence of 
the disassembly error (DE), inspection error (BIE), 
maintenance/repair error (BME), assembly error (BAE), 
inspection error (IE) and testing error (TE) are calculated using 
the Eq. (3). For instance, the probability of occurrence of 
inspection error (BIE), can be calculated as follows 
 
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ])4(1)3(1)2(1)1(11)( MPMPMPMPBIP E −−−−−=           (3) 
 
 
           
Table 1. Probability of human errors for individual tasks 
 
Based on the information included in Table 2 and by 
employing Eq. (2) the probability of the event D, i.e., a 
technician commits an error while performing the 
maintenance on the brake disc unit, is 0.2093. Following the 
same rationale, the probability of the event M, i.e., a 
technician makes an error while conducting their 
maintenance tasks, is finally calculated as follow 
 
[ ] [ ] [ ] 24.0)(1)(1)(11)( =−−−−= FPWPDPMP               (4)  
 
       
3. MANAGEMENT OF HUMAN ERROR  
 
It is pertinent to mention that the management of human error 
invloves not only investigation of past cases but also the 
improvement of the present situation to solve future problems 
in an organization (Grozdanovic and Stojilkovic  2006). The 
previous section outlined the method employed by which to 
assess the EPCs and the subsequent HEP calculations for 
tasks related to the maintenance of the rail bogie. Table 2 
outlines the six most common EPCs in this study. This list 
can be effectively used as a checklist of EPCs when 
conducting the maintenance audits. 
 
 
 
Table 2. Checklist of EPCs for maintenance of Railway   
Bogie  
 
The top three EPCs were: over-riding information, shortage 
of time available  and finally, the ability to detect and 
perceive. Each of these can provide by the basis of mitigation 
respectively as follows: provision of clear, self-explanatory 
manuals, scheduling sufficient time for maintenance tasks 
and by holding regular, targeted training and workshops for 
maintenance staff. Based on our findings, Figure 3 proposes 
a maintenance decision model to improve the overall quality 
of maintenance in the workshop. This model was verified by 
two maintenance supervisors (with more than 15 years of 
experience each). The use of this model will improve the 
quality of maintenance, enhance safety and lower 
maintenance costs; it will help management to explore and 
evaluate error producing conditions that adversely affect the 
performance of maintenance technicians. Currently, the two 
maintenance audits mentioned prior, R1 and R4, do not take 
into account any level of analysis human error, e.g. EPCs and 
hence the proposed maintenance decision model can in future 
be incorporated in these audits.  
Rank Error Producing Conditions (EPC’s) 
 
1 Over-riding information   
2 Shortage of time available  
3 Ability to detect and perceive  
4 Inexperienced operator  
5 Need for absolute judgment   
6 Mismatch between an operator’s model and that of  of 
designer  
  
)}(
1
1{1)( 0 iyP
k
i
yP ∏
=
−−=                                             (2) 
Assembly Measurement 
and 
inspection 
 Corrective   
  Maintenance 
Installation Testing 
0.04 0.04 0.05 0.02 0.03 
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Figure 3.    Proposed maintenance decision model 
 
4. CONCLUSIONS 
 
Railways have become an integral part of a nation’s 
economy and the future growth of a nation relies 
increasingly upon a safe and efficient railway network. The 
importance of human performance and human error in 
ensuring the safety of railway operations has been 
increasingly recognised. This has led to considerable 
efforts to understand the factors underlying human error for 
train drivers, signallers and dispatchers in order to mitigate 
against them. However, whilst accidents can also arise from 
human error in railway maintenance activities, there is little 
in the research to help identify these factors and to 
subsequently assess the probability of human error. For 
maximum reliability, equipment must be kept in good 
working condition, and for this, regular maintenance is 
critical. A number of factors directly or indirectly result in 
a decline in human performance, leading to errors in 
maintenance tasks. Typically, maintenance workshops for 
rolling stock rely upon periodic maintenance audits to 
ensure the safety of maintenance, but such audits fail to 
explicitly account for human performance and human error. 
We argue that the methodology shown in this paper to 
analyse human error probabilities in a railway maintenance 
system, specifically the safety critical railway bogie, can be 
used to bridge this gap. First it provides the relevant 
stakeholders with a robust universal methodology to better 
understand the role of humans in railway maintenance 
operations. Second, it can assess the performance of 
railway maintenance personnel in their workplace by using 
a well-known human reliability analysis method, HEART. 
The fact that experienced maintenance personnel provided 
the inputs and validated the outputs of the methodology 
lends credence to the methodology.  
  
The proposed methodology can help maintenance 
management understand various error producing conditions 
and serve as an input to modify policies and develop better 
guidelines for railway maintenance tasks. At the 
operational level, this should enable railway maintenance 
organisations to develop robust solutions to enhance human 
performance by i) identifying and assessing the error 
producing conditions that mostly affect the performance of 
railway operators and in turn by monitoring human 
performance and ii) investing resources to mitigate the 
impact of these factors on human performance. Secondly, 
the list of the EPCs can be used as a checklist to enhance 
the current maintenance audits and monitoring these EPCs 
over time will also enhance the overall management of 
maintenance.  
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APPENDIX -1 HEPs of some of the sub-tasks associated with the maintenance of Railway Bogie 
 
 
Maintenance of Disc Brake                                                                                             Nominal Human Reliability 
  
 Errors in Disassembly Task                                                            
Error producing 
Conditions (HEART Effect) 
EPOA 
   (0-1) 
 
Assessed Effect HEP 
 D1 Technician failed to successfully  take out  the brake unit    
from lever arms (causing  sudden release of brake unit) 
• Shortage of time available (X11) 0.3 ((11-1)x0.3)+1=4 0.012 
 D2 Damage to brake pads while removing them from the 
evidence supports. 
• Over-riding information  (X9) 0.4 
 
((9-1)x0.2)+1=2.6 0.007 
 .. ……….. ………… … ……… …… 
     
 Errors in Measurement and Inspection task   
 
M1 Technician failed to check the parts for cracks for any 
deformation and other external damage on link, arm and 
mounting frame  (damage more than 3 mm in depth is 
assessed as a crack) 
• Ability to detect and perceive 
(X10) 
 
0.4 
 
 
((10-1)x0.4)+1=4.6 
 
 
0.01 
 
M2 Technician failed to check correct dimensions of lever and 
steering link arm 
• Ability to detect and perceive 
(X10) 
0.3 
 
((10-1)x0.3)+1=3.7 0.01 
.. ………… ………… … ……… …… 
     Maintenance of Wheel 
 
     Inspection and Monitoring task    
 
W1 Technician missed identification of all cracks on the 
surface of the wheel 
• Ability to detect and perceive 
(X10) 
0.5 
 
((10-1)x0.5)+1=5.5 0.016 
W2 Technician unable to predict the level of noise coming 
from Lager box. 
• Need for absolute judgment  
(X1.6) 
• Ability to detect and perceive 
(X10) 
0.4 
 
0.4 
((1.6-1)x0.4)+1=1.2 
 
((10-1)x0.4)+1=4.6 
0.016 
 
.. ………… ………… … ……… …… 
Maintenance of Bogie Frame 
   
     Inspection task  
 
F1 Technician missed identification of cracks on the surface 
of the bogie frame, welded cross member to brake 
packages, welds at brackets for tie rods 
• Ability to detect and perceive 
(X10) 
0.3 ((10-1)x0.3)+1=3.7 0.011 
.. …………. ………… … ……… …… 
     Errors in Bogie Frame Repair task 
 
 
F2 Technician missed checking oil leakage from dampers 
during installation. 
• Ability to detect and perceive 
(X10) 
0.4 ((10-1)x0.4)+1=4.6 0.013 
.. ………… ………… … ……… …… 
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APPENDIX-2 Fault tree with the calculated value of top event and basic fault events (causes) 
 
 
 
